1.2 A spectrum of answers (part2)
Consciousness is an emergent property of certain biological systems
Here Koch puts forward a compelling analogy with the pre-DNA era and heredity. He cites William Bateson saying:
"The properties of living things are in some way attached to a material basis, perhaps in some special degree to nuclear chromatin, and yet it is unconceivable that particles of chromatin or of any other substance, however complex, can possess those powers which must be assigned to our factros or gens. The supposition that particles of chromatin, indistinguishable from each other and indeed almost homogeneous under any known test, can by their material nature confer all the properties of life surpasses the range of even the most convinced materialism."
If we translate this into the mind-body problem, I guess Koch is suggesting that in a few years they might site someone as saying:
"The properties of the mind are in some way attached to a material basis, perhaps in some special degree to neuronal activity, and yet it is unconceivable that neuronal activity or any other activity, however complex, can possess those powers which must be assigned to our minds. The supposition that neuronal activity can by their material nature confer all the properties of the mind surpasses the range of even the most convinced materialism."
I think this analogy here is a little bit missleading for one simple reason. In the heredity debate, the form of the answer was already known, whereas in the mind-body debate we don't know what or how the answer could potentially look like. In other words, had I asked the incredulous Bateson how would an answer look like, he might have said: "Well, unlikely as it is, you would have to find a mechanism by which to store lots of information in molecules. " What would the mind-body skeptic say?
Here Koch puts forward a compelling analogy with the pre-DNA era and heredity. He cites William Bateson saying:
"The properties of living things are in some way attached to a material basis, perhaps in some special degree to nuclear chromatin, and yet it is unconceivable that particles of chromatin or of any other substance, however complex, can possess those powers which must be assigned to our factros or gens. The supposition that particles of chromatin, indistinguishable from each other and indeed almost homogeneous under any known test, can by their material nature confer all the properties of life surpasses the range of even the most convinced materialism."
If we translate this into the mind-body problem, I guess Koch is suggesting that in a few years they might site someone as saying:
"The properties of the mind are in some way attached to a material basis, perhaps in some special degree to neuronal activity, and yet it is unconceivable that neuronal activity or any other activity, however complex, can possess those powers which must be assigned to our minds. The supposition that neuronal activity can by their material nature confer all the properties of the mind surpasses the range of even the most convinced materialism."
I think this analogy here is a little bit missleading for one simple reason. In the heredity debate, the form of the answer was already known, whereas in the mind-body debate we don't know what or how the answer could potentially look like. In other words, had I asked the incredulous Bateson how would an answer look like, he might have said: "Well, unlikely as it is, you would have to find a mechanism by which to store lots of information in molecules. " What would the mind-body skeptic say?
posted by Camilo at 11:34 AM
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